Review of GSA’s Revised Plan for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters Consolidation Project

August 27, 2018
Introduction

On February 12, 2018, the General Services Administration (GSA) presented a revised plan for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) headquarters consolidation project to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW Committee). The plan recommended razing the FBI’s existing headquarters facility, the J. Edgar Hoover (JEH) building on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., and constructing a new headquarters facility on that site. This was a change from GSA’s previous approach of seeking a campus facility for the FBI at a suburban location in the Washington, D.C., region.

The GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review on March 12, 2018, in response to a request from the Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on Government Operations. Our objective was to review GSA’s decision-making process for the revised FBI headquarters project plan, including an analysis of whether the revised plan properly accounts for the full costs and security requirements of the project.¹ In the course of the review, we also encountered an issue concerning testimony GSA Administrator Emily Murphy provided on April 17, 2018, to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government in response to questions regarding White House involvement in decision-making regarding the project. We included that issue in our review.

To conduct this review, we held 20 interviews, including with Murphy, GSA Acting General Counsel Jack St. John, GSA Public Buildings Service (PBS) Commissioner Daniel Mathews, and the Unit Chief of the FBI’s Headquarters Program Management Office; reviewed over 50,000 GSA documents and emails concerning the FBI headquarters consolidation project; and reviewed congressional testimony of GSA and FBI officials in 2017 and 2018 concerning the decision to rebuild the facility at the JEH site.

Early in the review the OIG learned that during the course of GSA’s decision-making on the revised FBI headquarters plan, Murphy met with the President on January 24, 2018, about the project. When we asked about the meeting, some GSA witnesses refused to answer any questions about this and other relevant White House meetings, and some of those said they were told or believed the information was subject to executive privilege. We sought to determine whether GSA took the position that executive privilege precluded sharing information with the OIG, which is part of GSA and within the Executive Branch. Ultimately, GSA’s Acting General Counsel informed us that he received direction from White House Counsel’s Office regarding the matter. He told us that pursuant to those directions, GSA employees were authorized to disclose to the OIG the existence of the White House meetings, discuss who attended, and discuss any high level agreements that resulted from the meetings;

¹ The OIG has been monitoring GSA’s efforts related to the FBI headquarters consolidation since August 2013. On March 30, 2017, we issued Audit of PBS’s Planning and Funding for Exchange Projects (Report Number A160024/P/R/R17004). The FBI headquarters consolidation exchange project was one of the projects that we reviewed in this audit. We reported that PBS had not fully factored risk into its planning for exchange projects and as a result, cancelled or chose not to pursue several exchange projects.
but not to disclose any statements made by the President. We describe the information we received about the meetings in this report.

The revised plan for the FBI headquarters project presented to the Senate EPW Committee contains a cost comparison showing that the plan to raze and rebuild at the JEH site would be less costly than the cancelled FBI exchange procurement. However, we found that GSA did not include all of the costs in its analysis, and that the JEH demolish and rebuild plan would actually be more costly. We also found that GSA and the FBI intend to construct a Level V secure facility, but until the FBI finalizes a program of requirements it is not clear how this will be achieved. Finally, we found that Murphy’s congressional testimony was incomplete and may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.

This report first describes background information regarding the FBI headquarters consolidation project and GSA’s decision-making process for the revised project plan. It then assesses whether the revised plan GSA provided to the Senate EPW Committee properly accounts for the full costs of the JEH rebuild and the security requirements for the project. Finally, the report describes our concerns regarding Murphy’s testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government on April 17, 2018.

GSA provided written comments to our draft report in a response dated August 10, 2018. GSA’s comments are included in their entirety in Appendix A. We also received comments from Administrator Murphy on the draft report. Because those comments were made in her individual capacity, we have not appended them to the report. In addition, we made excerpts of the report available to FBI officials for their review and comment.

We considered all of the comments we received and have addressed those relating to factual accuracy where appropriate in the body of this report. None of the resulting revisions affected our report conclusions. We respond to certain additional comments made by GSA and Administrator Murphy in Appendix B.

Factual Background

Need for New FBI Headquarters

The FBI has occupied the JEH building since construction was completed in 1974. Since then, the FBI’s operations and duties have evolved. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the FBI expanded its mission to include greater national security responsibilities, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber security. To accommodate its expanded mission, the FBI identified a need for a new headquarters facility in its 2005 Asset Management Plan.

In the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Congress directed the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the security concerns of the JEH building and associated offsite locations. In a report issued in November 2011, GAO found that actions were needed to address issues with the condition of the FBI headquarters. In response to that review, then FBI Associate Deputy Director Kevin Perkins noted: “[A] new consolidated FBI Headquarters facility
is urgently needed, and we view this as one of our highest priorities for the foreseeable future.” In a March 2013 hearing of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, entitled “Proposal for a New Consolidated FBI Headquarters Building,” Perkins referenced the November 2011 GAO report and stated:

> The FBI has implemented some countermeasures at the JEH building to improve the security of the facility, but those efforts are not a substitution for relocating FBI Headquarters employees to a location that affords the ability to provide true security in accordance with ISC [Interagency Security Committee] standards.

In assessing the concerns raised about the JEH building, GSA and the FBI recognized an opportunity to consolidate FBI personnel at JEH and other locations throughout the D.C. metropolitan area into one modern facility. GSA expected the new headquarters facility would save close to a million square feet in rentable space, eliminate the need for FBI leased space in the National Capital Region, and provide updated workplace solutions tailored to meet the FBI’s needs.

**GSA Plans Exchange of the JEH Building for a New Headquarters Campus**

In December 2012, GSA announced its intent to find a new headquarters facility for the FBI. GSA’s plan was to partner with a developer that would design and construct a consolidated headquarters facility in exchange for title to the JEH building and its land. In January 2013, GSA issued a Request for Information to garner reaction from members of the development community, local and state jurisdictions, and other interested parties regarding feasibility, issues, and considerations related to a potential exchange project structure.

In November 2013, the Request for Information was followed by a Request for Expressions of Interest for sites within the National Capital Region to be used for the development of a new FBI headquarters. GSA identified three sites where a new campus headquarters could be built: (1) Springfield, Virginia; (2) Greenbelt, Maryland; and (3) Landover, Maryland.

On December 19, 2014, GSA issued its Phase I Request for Proposals (RFP) for the government to select a short list of no more than five offerors to compete in the Phase II RFP. On October 13, 2015, GSA identified a short list of offerors to proceed to Phase II of the RFP. On January 22, 2016, GSA issued the Phase II RFP to these qualified offerors.

In the Fiscal Year 2017 budget request, GSA and the FBI requested a combined $1.405 billion to finance the headquarters project. GSA estimated that the $1.405 billion request, combined with the value of JEH and approximately $390 million in prior year appropriations, would be enough to fund the project. While the RFP allowed GSA to award the exchange agreement without full funding, GSA maintained that making the award without full upfront funding would put the project at risk.

In early 2017, GSA received developer proposals, which included proposed values for JEH. GSA did not deem the proposals fair and reasonable. GSA found that the proposals fell far short of
the value assumptions that GSA had used when drafting the 2017 budget request. In May 2017, Congress appropriated $523 million for the FBI headquarters project, which was $882 million below the GSA and FBI request. GSA had not included any funding for the FBI headquarters consolidation in its Fiscal Year 2018 budget request, given its expectation that the Fiscal Year 2017 budget request would be fully funded.

**GSA Cancels JEH Exchange and Develops a New Headquarters Plan**

On July 11, 2017, GSA cancelled the FBI exchange procurement, citing a lack of funding as a main reason for the cancellation. The Senate EPW Committee held a hearing, “FBI Headquarters Consolidation Project – What Happened and What’s Next,” on August 2, 2017. The Senate EPW Committee directed then-Acting PBS Commissioner Michael Gelber to provide a new plan for the FBI’s headquarters needs within 120 days.

On August 2, 2017, Christopher Wray was sworn in as the Director of the FBI. On August 3, 2017, Mathews was sworn in as the PBS Commissioner.

Following the August 2, 2017, Senate EPW Committee hearing, GSA and the FBI met regularly to discuss multiple acquisition strategies. Options considered included traditional construction, phased construction, and public-private partnership lease construction with a discounted purchase option or a ground lease-leaseback. GSA focused on a financing strategy. GSA officials told us they believed that public-private partnership options could be used to finance the project in the absence of a multi-billion dollar upfront appropriation.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for applying the budget scorekeeping guidelines (scoring rules) for federal real property transactions set forth in OMB Circular A-11. OMB uses the criteria in OMB Circular A-11 to determine whether a federal real property transaction scores as a capital lease or an operating lease. If the project scores as a capital lease, Congress must appropriate the full cost of the project, plus interest upfront, for the project to proceed. If the project scores as an operating lease, Congress need only appropriate the annual cost of lease payments, plus interest.

GSA’s interpretation of the scoring rules allowed for a public-private partnership in the form of a ground lease-leaseback to score as an operating lease. GSA advanced its interpretation of OMB Circular A-11 as a matter of policy. As the November 30, 2017, due date for the plan to the Senate EPW Committee approached, the FBI headquarters project intersected with GSA’s policy efforts. GSA officials viewed the FBI headquarters project as a mechanism to apply its broader interpretation of OMB Circular A-11. This interpretation of the scoring rules also presented a viable acquisition strategy for the FBI headquarters, according to GSA officials.

While GSA explored financing options, the FBI evaluated its program of requirements. In a November 6, 2017, conference call with GSA and local government officials, GSA communicated

---

2 In a ground lease-leaseback, the government leases federally-owned land to a private entity, which would then construct a facility and lease the building back to the government. OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, governs the budgetary treatment of ground lease-leasebacks.
that the FBI’s program of requirements was unchanged from the exchange procurement. In late November, the FBI informed GSA that it was developing a plan that reduced the cost and the scope of the project. A chronology created contemporaneously by GSA’s Project Executive reflects that in early December 2017, the FBI advised GSA that the FBI planned to reduce its headquarters’ personnel requirement by approximately 2,000 people by relocating them nationwide.

After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA commented that in a November 17, 2017, meeting between Mathews and an FBI Assistant Deputy Director, “[I]t became clear to GSA that the FBI was seriously considering the Pennsylvania Avenue site, at the direction of FBI’s senior leadership.” In her separate comments on the draft report Murphy asserted that the FBI made the decision to stay at the JEH site well before Murphy met with the President. Many of the GSA witnesses we interviewed told us that the FBI under Wray’s leadership decided against a suburban campus and in favor of remaining at the JEH site with reduced personnel requirements. Director Wray confirmed to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee that constructing a new building at the JEH site would allow the FBI to reside at the location that the FBI needed while providing the necessary security.

It is not clear from the information GSA provided us precisely when GSA became aware of the FBI’s interest in staying at the JEH site. As we describe below, GSA did not focus on the JEH site in its decision-making process until late December 2017 or early January 2018.

**December 20, 2017, White House Meeting**

On December 1, 2017, GSA received a 60-day extension from the Senate EPW Committee to provide the new plan for the FBI headquarters needs. The new deadline for the revised plan was January 29, 2018.

Murphy was sworn in as GSA Administrator on December 12, 2017. On December 14, 2017, after meeting with the FBI, Mathews emailed Murphy stating, “There are several things coming out of this meeting we need to discuss. WH has been talking to FBI too.”

On December 20, 2017, Murphy met with White House Chief of Staff John Kelly and OMB Director Mick Mulvaney in response to a request from Kelly for an update on the FBI headquarters project. Mathews also attended the meeting.

Murphy told us that she and Mathews went to the meeting prepared to discuss campus options for the project. She said that when they began discussing the campus option, Kelly and

---

3 In a November 6, 2017, email recapping the conference call, the GSA Project Executive stated, “I reiterated that these were informal discussions to accommodate the FBI’s internal briefings and that at this time the FBI program and requirements remain unchanged from the previous procurement. I also indicated that GSA is not currently looking for new sites.”

4 See Appendix A, page A-2.

Mulvaney informed them that the FBI may no longer be seeking a consolidated campus. Murphy said that Kelly and Mulvaney told her that the FBI was concerned about the location of the headquarters. She said they also may have mentioned that the FBI was looking to stay in Washington, D.C. According to Murphy, Kelly suggested that GSA touch base with the FBI to get everyone on the same page. Murphy stated that Kelly and Mulvaney indicated that the goal was to make the FBI happy and that the FBI should be driving the requirement. Murphy noted that funding was a challenge to the project. Murphy also recollected that Kelly or Mulvaney may have mentioned that the President would want an update on the project.

**Discussions Between GSA and the FBI About Keeping FBI Headquarters at the JEH Site**

On December 20, 2017, Mathews sent an email to his FBI counterpart on the project and suggested a telephone conversation between Murphy and Wray. On December 21, 2017, Mathews received and passed to Murphy a slide presentation from the FBI regarding renovation options for the JEH building. On December 22, 2017, Murphy received a call from Wray. According to Murphy, Wray informed her in that call of the FBI’s interest in remaining at the existing site.

On January 4, 2018, GSA and FBI officials met at the JEH building to discuss options for the FBI headquarters. According to then-GSA Associate Administrator and Acting Chief of Staff P. Brennan Hart III, the meeting was attended by himself, Murphy, Mathews, Wray, then-FBI Associate Deputy Director David Bowdich, and the Unit Chief of the FBI’s Headquarters Program Management Office. In his interview, Hart characterized this meeting as the first time that GSA officials met with Wray regarding the project.

Hart informed us that during the January 4, 2018, meeting, GSA and FBI officials discussed plans to renovate the JEH building versus demolishing it and rebuilding on the same site. Murphy told us that at this meeting, FBI staff advised GSA that its headcount requirements had changed and the FBI believed it could stay at its current location and renovate JEH. According to Murphy, the FBI had hired a contractor to develop plans to renovate JEH which accounted for the reduced headquarters personnel count. The FBI presented the renovation plans to GSA. These plans recommended renovating one quarter of the building at a time while FBI personnel remained operating in the sections that were not undergoing renovation. Murphy told us the GSA team was surprised by this decision. Murphy said that up to this point, all discussions she was aware of had focused on a campus scenario for the FBI headquarters. She said that JEH was not GSA’s preferred site and that a lot of work had gone into the campus concept.

According to Mathews, GSA communicated its concern to the FBI that if the FBI headquarters stayed at its existing site, it would be difficult to obtain congressional support for full upfront funding for the project. Mathews told us that, if the cost savings between a suburban campus site and the existing site were similar, Wray’s preference was to remain at the JEH building. If the campus scenario offered significant savings, Mathews stated, Wray was not opposed to a suburban campus site.

One suggestion briefly discussed at the meeting was a plan to utilize a smaller site for FBI senior leadership in Washington, D.C., and a larger campus for FBI personnel. However, Hart told us
that Wray wanted the FBI headquarters’ personnel in one location. Murphy also told us that Wray stated that proximity to the Department of Justice (DOJ) was important to the FBI. Mathews stated that, by the conclusion of the January 4, 2018, meeting, he had not been able to persuade Wray to leave the JEH site in favor of the campus scenario.

**Discussions Between GSA and the FBI About Renovation Versus Demolishing and Rebuilding**

After the January 4, 2018, meeting, GSA and the FBI worked to develop options for the FBI to remain at the existing site. As GSA officials evaluated a renovation of the JEH building, they developed serious reservations. GSA officials raised concerns regarding cost, constructability, security, and impact on operations. For example, GSA officials noted that the deteriorating structure of the JEH building would make it problematic to harden the building. Mathews said that it would be “extremely difficult” to renovate while JEH was occupied. The PBS Office of Design and Construction advised him to disagree with a renovation, as it was a “bad idea.” Mathews also noted that if a renovation required swing space (temporary office space during construction), it would be faster, cheaper, and more secure to demolish and rebuild.

Given the risks associated with renovation and the FBI’s expressed desire to remain at the JEH site, GSA’s efforts pivoted to developing a plan to demolish and rebuild at the JEH site. Murphy said she thought that PBS had identified the demolish-rebuild option at an earlier point in time, but had dismissed the idea then due to the FBI’s personnel requirements. With the decrease in personnel requirements for JEH, Murphy said that demolish and rebuild was a viable option.

Murphy told us that sometime between January 4, 2018, and January 24, 2018, she discussed the demolish-rebuild option with Wray in a telephone call. Murphy said that Wray “liked the plan,” but had some reservations. Murphy stated that she and Wray discussed concerns related to ensuring that the numbers were accurate and determining where to relocate FBI personnel. Murphy noted that Wray was particularly concerned that if the FBI left JEH, it would not be able to return after the rebuild was complete.

Murphy told us that as of January 23, 2018, GSA’s recommendation was to demolish and rebuild at the JEH site with a ground lease-leaseback to finance the project. The FBI, according to Murphy, was developing an estimate for renovation. At that point in time, no decisions had been made regarding funding.

**White House Meetings on January 24, 2018**

GSA emails and photographs reflect that Murphy, Wray, and others met with the President regarding the FBI headquarters project on January 24, 2018.

When we asked Murphy for information about the meeting, her private counsel stated Murphy was not authorized to discuss specific communications with the President. However, she was
authorized to disclose the existence of White House meetings, attendees at the meetings, the topics of meetings with the President, and the outcomes of the meetings with the President.\(^6\)

Murphy told us that she attended two meetings about the FBI project at the White House on January 24, 2018. The first meeting occurred in Kelly’s office, and immediately preceded the second meeting. The second meeting was in the Oval Office with the President.

**Meeting in Kelly’s office.** Murphy said that she attended the first meeting with Kelly, Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, and Wray. Murphy told us that Mulvaney requested the meeting to ensure that everyone was on the same page prior to the meeting with the President.

Murphy said that during this meeting, Wray reiterated his concern that if the FBI left the JEH building, it would not be able to return to the JEH site after the rebuild was completed. Murphy said that Rosenstein stated that close proximity between DOJ and the FBI headquarters was important to DOJ. Due to the unique security and operational requirements of the FBI headquarters, Murphy and Mulvaney provided assurances that the FBI would return to the site because the building would be designed and constructed to meet the FBI’s specific requirements. Murphy stated that upon receiving this assurance, Wray agreed to the demolish-rebuild plan at the existing site.

According to Murphy, all involved in the meeting acknowledged the challenges to a demolish-rebuild plan. The challenges identified were obtaining authorization for the funding level and scope of the project, and securing appropriations for the project. Murphy recalled saying that White House assistance with the funding issues would be appreciated. Mulvaney indicated that all of the agencies needed to work together to secure funding and authorization. Murphy stated that she did not recall discussing a ground lease-leaseback option at that meeting.

**Oval Office Meeting.** Immediately following the meeting in Kelly’s office, Murphy met with the President in the Oval Office along with Kelly, Mulvaney, Rosenstein, and Wray. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an update to the President regarding the FBI headquarters project.

According to Murphy, Mulvaney was the first person in the meeting to state that the plan was to demolish and rebuild the FBI headquarters at the JEH site. Murphy told us that the renovation option was not raised at the Oval Office meeting with the President.

Murphy described the conversation in the meeting as “back and forth” with “free flow discussion.” Murphy told us that she, Wray, and Mulvaney explained how they collaborated to reach a decision to demolish and rebuild the FBI headquarters. They also discussed swing space, authorization, and appropriation challenges.

\(^6\) During Murphy’s interview, her counsel also stated that the White House Counsel’s Office had advised GSA’s Acting General Counsel that the presidential communications privilege was being asserted. After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA commented that this was incorrect and that the White House had not asserted executive privilege. Rather, “[t]he White House informed the Administrator, through the Acting General Counsel, that she was not authorized to disclose the content of presidential communications from those meetings. A formal assertion of executive privilege, therefore, was not necessary to justify or explain the Administrator’s refusal to disclose those communications.” *Appendix A*, page A-8.
Murphy said she presented the ground lease-leaseback as the best funding option because it was more cost effective than incremental funding. She said she also explained that the ground lease-leaseback was less cost effective than full upfront funding, but that GSA did not think that the project could secure full upfront funding.

Murphy told us that there was a general consensus in the room that the government should own the building. Murphy said that she distinguished a ground lease-leaseback option from a lease purchase option. She said she explained that the government would own the building at the end of the term of the lease under the ground lease-leaseback option. Under a lease purchase option, Murphy explained that the government would have the option of purchasing the building at the end of the term of the lease.

According to Murphy, the discussion included the challenges facing the project, such as potential resistance from local congressional delegations. There was a consensus to collaborate to find the funds, develop a legislative strategy, and locate swing space. Murphy told us that Wray was excited about the project; however, he had lingering concerns that the FBI would remain in the swing space, rather than return to the new building. Murphy told us that Wray was interested in making this happen as fast as possible and was grateful to be working together. Murphy said that Mulvaney agreed to work closely with GSA and the FBI on this project.

As described above, pursuant to guidance from the White House Counsel’s Office, Murphy did not provide the OIG with information concerning any specific communications or direction from the President at the meeting. However, Murphy stated that at the end of the meeting, she understood that they were moving forward with the demolish-rebuild project at the JEH site, funded through a ground lease-leaseback. She also told us that immediately following the meeting, she communicated that understanding to GSA personnel involved in the project.

GSA emails, including emails from Mathews and Hart, reflect that GSA and FBI personnel who were involved with the project, but not in attendance at the meeting, also understood that the meeting had resulted in a decision or direction to move forward at the JEH site using a ground lease-leaseback funding mechanism.7 Mathews told us he was not at liberty to talk about the meeting because it was a decision involving the White House. We asked Hart to explain references to the President’s “direction” or “instruction” used in his emails. Hart told us he understood the “direction” was simply to execute the plan the FBI and GSA had recommended.

**Discussions Between GSA and OMB Regarding Funding**

Shortly after the January 24, 2018, White House meeting, OMB personnel raised objections to the ground lease-leaseback funding option due to scoring rules. GSA leadership endeavored to

---

7 For example, a January 27, 2018, email from Hart to Mathews states: “Ideally I think it would first recap the oval meeting with what POTUS directed everyone to do then ask Emily (GSA) to execute POTUS’s orders.” In addition, a January, 28, 2018, email from Mathews to the Assistant Director of the FBI Finance Division states: “Though I don’t see us conceding these two key points, GL LB [ground lease-leaseback] can be classified as an operating lease and demolish rebuild, as they are necessary to deliver the project the president wants on the timetable he wants it done.”
resolve the scoring concerns with OMB. However, according to Murphy, OMB ultimately determined that the ground lease-leaseback was not a viable option.

GSA continued negotiations with OMB on how to fund the project. On February 12, 2018, as part of the Fiscal Year 2018 budget negotiations, the Administration provided Congress with a list of additional items that Congress could consider funding in the budget. The list included $2.175 billion for the FBI headquarters project. According to GSA officials, OMB indicated to GSA that the FBI project would be funded as part of this budget “add-back.” However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, signed into law on March 23, 2018, did not include funding for the project.

Throughout the negotiations with GSA, OMB presented another option for funding the project – the proposed Federal Capital Revolving Fund. The $10 billion fund would be structured to allow federal agencies to meet large, upfront dollar obligations needed for large scale real property projects. However, the Federal Capital Revolving Fund has not yet been implemented and there is uncertainty as to whether Congress will approve it.

**GSA and the FBI Submit Revised FBI Headquarters Plan**

On February 12, 2018, GSA and the FBI provided the *FBI Headquarters Revised Nationally-Focused Consolidation Plan* (Revised FBI Headquarters Plan) to the Senate EPW Committee. The document outlined the Administration’s plan to seek $2.175 billion to fund the demolition and construction of a new facility at the JEH site. The plan identified the next step as GSA submitting a prospectus to Congress. In the months since GSA and the FBI submitted this plan, Congress has questioned the agencies about it.

On February 15, 2018, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Government Operations Subcommittee held a hearing, “General Services Administration – Checking in with the Government’s Acquisition and Property Manager.” At that hearing, committee members sought information regarding the reasons for rejection of the campus plan in favor of the demolish-rebuild plan.

Similarly, on February 28, 2018, the Senate EPW Committee held its “Hearing on Oversight: FBI Headquarters Consolidation Project.” At the hearing, committee members expressed bipartisan concern about the revised plan. In response to a question regarding whether he was aware of conversations with the President about the project, Mathews indicated that he was not in a position to answer that question. Mathews was also asked whether he had any conversations or communications with the President or any senior White House staff about the project. Mathews answered that he had not spoken with the President, but later clarified that he had spoken with senior White House officials.

On April 17, 2018, Murphy testified before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government regarding GSA’s Fiscal Year 2019 budget. She was questioned about White House involvement in the FBI headquarters project and did not disclose the White House meetings.
White House Meeting: June 15, 2018

On June 15, 2018, Murphy attended a meeting with the President at the White House to discuss the FBI headquarters project. Kelly; Rosenstein; Wray; Russ Vought, Deputy Director of OMB; Donald McGahn, White House Counsel; and Marc Short, White House Director of Legislative Affairs and Assistant to the President also attended the meeting. Murphy said the invitees discussed ongoing congressional pressure for a campus project and the funding challenges.

Issues

Project Cost Analysis

GSA and the FBI submitted the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan to the Senate EPW Committee on February 12, 2018. The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan estimated total costs of $3.328 billion to raze the JEH building and build a new headquarters on the site (JEH rebuild). The JEH rebuild is expected to house 8,300 personnel. According to the plan, taking into account previously appropriated funding, GSA and the FBI will require an additional $2.175 billion to move forward with the JEH rebuild.

The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan contrasts the cost of the JEH rebuild with the cost of the cancelled full consolidation exchange procurement (JEH exchange). Though the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan estimated the JEH exchange to have a higher cost of $3.565 billion, the JEH exchange was to be a larger facility and house more people. Figure 1 is an excerpt from the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan that compares the cost of the previously cancelled JEH exchange (referred to as “full consolidation” in Figure 1) to the newly recommended JEH rebuild strategy. According to Figure 1, given the previously appropriated funding, GSA and the FBI would have required $2.412 billion in additional funding to move forward with the JEH exchange.

**Figure 1 – Excerpt from GSA and the FBI’s Revised FBI Headquarters Plan**
The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not include the full costs of the JEH rebuild. The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not accurately portray the costs and shortfall comparison between the previously cancelled JEH exchange and the JEH rebuild. The plan shows that the JEH rebuild would cost less and require less additional funding than the JEH exchange. However, we determined that the JEH rebuild will have a higher project cost and require more additional funding than the JEH exchange would have. We recreated the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis for a more transparent cost comparison (see Figure 2). We discuss our recalculations in the subheadings below.

**Figure 2 – OIG Recalculated Funding Gap Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JEH Exchange</th>
<th>JEH Rebuild</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total cost (from Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis)</td>
<td>$3.565 billion</td>
<td>$3.328 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add: Non-JEH construction cost</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$0.459 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add: Personnel relocation cost (2,306 people)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$0.057 billion 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total OIG Recalculated Cost</strong></td>
<td>$3.565 billion</td>
<td>$3.844 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: Prior appropriations and DOJ Working Capital Fund (from Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis)</td>
<td>($1.153 billion)</td>
<td>($1.153 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: JEH exchange value (market rate) 9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total OIG Recalculated Shortfall</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$2.232 - $2.691 billion 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA asserted that that our analysis in Figure 2 creates a misleading impression that a true comparison can be made between the JEH rebuild and the cancelled JEH exchange. However, GSA itself purported to compare the costs of those two scenarios in its Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis (see Figure 1). As we describe further below, GSA’s purported comparison omits significant relevant items.

**The JEH value was not factored into the funding needed for the JEH exchange.** GSA did not account for the value that it would receive for JEH under the JEH exchange. Although GSA noted an anticipated $750 million value for the JEH exchange in the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, it ultimately excluded that value in the JEH exchange total shortfall calculation. The anticipated JEH value should have been included in order to accurately show the total shortfall calculation. Furthermore, GSA should have used a more accurate JEH value, based upon proposals that GSA received from developers during the exchange procurement. To be most

---

8 In response to our inquiry, the FBI estimated $57 million for personnel relocation costs. After reviewing excerpts of the draft report, the FBI stated that the estimate may range from $20 million to $60 million and will be dictated by the number of employees accepting a transfer.

9 Redactions in this report represent either procurement sensitive information or non-Senior Executive Service personnel names.

10 According to the Unit Chief of the FBI’s Headquarters Program Management Office, the FBI has received some funding for three of the four non-JEH construction projects. Accordingly, we present a range for the total OIG recalculated shortfall.
conservative in our recalculation, we incorporated the lowest JEH value proposed during the exchange procurement, (see Figure 2).

The proposed exchange agreement between GSA and the developer under the JEH exchange supports our conclusion. In the exchange procurement, GSA would not have needed an appropriation for the agreed-upon value of JEH. The JEH value would have been designated by the developer and accepted by GSA in the exchange agreement. This JEH value would have been recognized in the latter years of construction of the new facility. The exchange procurement’s Phase II Request for Proposals stated:

As part of this procurement, Offerors are required, among other things, to establish the credit they will contribute toward the cost of the consolidated FBI Headquarters in exchange for JEH. It is the Government’s intent that this credit will be utilized toward the end of construction of the consolidated FBI Headquarters facility prior to substantial completion and payment of the Developer’s profit or incentives. It is also the Government’s intent to make regular progress payments to the Contractor during the construction phase of the project up to a defined Government contribution amount, as described and set forth in the Contract. [emphasis added]

Therefore, GSA would have known, before construction began, that it would not need to request funding for the JEH value under the JEH exchange. Because GSA would not need funding equal to the JEH value, it should have factored the JEH value in the JEH exchange total shortfall calculation.

The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not present per person costs in its cost comparison. Although the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan estimated the JEH rebuild would be a less costly option than the JEH exchange, it does not show that the JEH rebuild would cost more per person. The JEH exchange planned to house 10,606 personnel. However, the FBI adjusted the headquarters personnel requirement as part of its “nationally-focused consolidation,” under which the FBI would move employees out of the National Capital Region and into facilities in Huntsville, Alabama; Pocatello, Idaho; Clarksburg, West Virginia; and Quantico, Virginia. Due to the plan to relocate employees out of the National Capital Region, the FBI reduced its headquarters headcount requirement to 8,300 personnel. A comparison of the total cost of the two project plans and the per person costs is displayed in Figure 3 below:

![Figure 3 – Comparison of Cost per Person](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>Personnel Count</th>
<th>Cost/Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JEH Exchange</td>
<td>$3.565 billion</td>
<td>10,606</td>
<td>$336,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEH Rebuild</td>
<td>$3.328 billion</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>$400,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown above, based on GSA’s cost estimates, the cost per person for the JEH Rebuild is higher than that of the JEH Exchange.
Relocation and non-JEH construction costs are not included. The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan estimate of $3.328 billion for the JEH rebuild is understated because it does not capture relocation and non-JEH construction costs. The FBI estimated $516 million for these costs. The JEH exchange was planned to accommodate 10,606 personnel, while the JEH rebuild plan seeks to accommodate 8,300. In order to meaningfully compare the two plans, the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan should have accounted for the relocation and construction costs associated with housing the 2,306 personnel at other FBI facilities.

The FBI plans to move these 2,306 employees into facilities in Alabama, Idaho, Virginia, and West Virginia. However, the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not account for costs associated with relocating these employees. In response to our inquiry, the FBI estimated $57 million for employee relocation (see Figure 2).11

In addition, the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not account for costs associated with the construction necessary to accommodate the relocated headquarters personnel. FBI personnel stated that construction activities in Huntsville, Pocatello, Clarksburg, and Quantico are not solely attributable to the relocation of headquarters personnel. Rather, these construction activities are associated with the implementation of the FBI’s broader space planning. The FBI estimated the construction “cost-share” for the personnel to be relocated under the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan as $459 million (see Figure 2).

We asked the FBI about the four locations where personnel may be relocated and the FBI provided the following responses:

- Huntsville, Alabama – The FBI recently secured funding related to the Huntsville site. The FBI plans to move approximately 1,800 personnel to Huntsville related to the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan. This does not represent all of the expansion that the FBI foresees at this site.
- Pocatello, Idaho – This project has been funded and construction is underway. The FBI estimates that Pocatello will accommodate approximately 250-300 personnel related to the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.
- Quantico, Virginia – There is no construction currently at this site to accommodate individuals relocating related to the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.12

---

11 After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA stated that it included relocation costs in its Revised FBI Headquarters Plan as part of the costs associated with FBI Fit-Out and Swing Space. This is incorrect. The FBI Fit-Out and Swing Space costs do not include the $57 million associated with relocating 2,306 personnel to Alabama, Idaho, Virginia, and West Virginia.

12 After reviewing excerpts of the draft report, the FBI commented that Quantico is not expected to see a net increase in the number of personnel as a result of the FBI’s revised national headquarters strategy.
• Clarksburg, West Virginia – This project has been funded and construction is imminent. The FBI is renovating its cafeteria in order to accommodate approximately 150-200 personnel related to the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.\textsuperscript{13}

After GSA and the FBI submitted the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, GSA officials discussed internally and with the FBI whether these costs should have been included in the plan. A document internal to GSA suggests these costs should have been included in the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, but that officials unintentionally omitted the information. Further, a GSA official involved in the cost estimating agreed with our conclusion that these construction costs should have been included in the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.

As a result of excluding non-JEH renovation costs, the JEH rebuild cost in the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan is understated by $516 million.

**Swing space cost estimates were appropriately excluded.** Swing space, the temporary space for FBI personnel during construction, is one major cost item under the JEH rebuild plan that would not have existed under the JEH exchange proposal. Under the JEH rebuild plan, GSA will have to locate and renovate swing space for the FBI while the new headquarters building is under construction. Under the JEH exchange proposal, the FBI would have continued to occupy the JEH building while the new headquarters facility was constructed, and therefore swing space would not have been needed.

GSA appropriately included design and construction costs associated with the FBI swing space in its cost estimate comparison, but did not include the costs the FBI would incur in rent payments for the swing space. GSA personnel maintain that the costs associated with the FBI remaining in the JEH building and the cost of swing space rent would be roughly equivalent. If these costs were equivalent, there would be no need to include swing space rent in the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan. We compared the cost of operating and maintaining the current space at JEH with a market estimate for swing space rent and agree that the costs would be roughly equivalent.

**Facility Security Level Analysis**

Executive Order 12977 established the ISC in October 1995. The ISC revised *The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard* (ISC standard) in November 2016. The ISC standard defines the criteria and processes that those responsible for the security of a facility should use to determine its facility security level (security level) and provides an integrated, single source of physical security countermeasures for all federal facilities.

**The FBI is responsible for determining security level and related countermeasures.** According to the ISC standard:

\textsuperscript{13} After reviewing excerpts of the draft report, the FBI commented that the renovation will convert a portion of its cafeteria into office space in order to accommodate the increase of approximately 150-200 personnel as part of the FBI’s national facility strategy which is related to but not dependent on the new FBI headquarters project.
The responsibility for making the final [security level] determination rests with the tenant(s) who must devise a risk management strategy and, if possible, fund the appropriate security countermeasures to mitigate the risk:

For single-tenant facilities owned or leased by the government, a representative of the tenant\(^{14}\) agency will make the [security level] determination in consultation with the owning or leasing department or agency and the security organization responsible for the facility.

The ISC standard also states, “The facility’s security organization will conduct a risk assessment to identify risk(s)….When a facility has one Federal tenant with [sic] law enforcement or security function housed in the facility, this entity should be selected as the security organization for the facility.” In its 2011 report, *Federal Bureau of Investigation: Actions Needed to Document Security Decisions and Address Issues with Condition of Headquarters Buildings*, GAO noted that, “In cases where the FBI is the sole tenant in the facility, the FBI usually signs a waiver stating that the FBI is responsible for conducting its own assessments.”\(^{15}\) Furthermore, the ISC standard describes a building tenant’s responsibility to mitigate or accept risk. Building tenants must fund security measures to reduce risk, or accept the assessed risk and potential consequences. Therefore, as the lone tenant for the new FBI headquarters building, it is the FBI’s decision to fully mitigate or accept risk.

**The FBI and GSA plan for a Level V facility.** The ISC standard bases security level on a score of five factors:

- Mission Criticality;
- Symbolism;
- Facility Population;
- Facility Size; and
- Threat to Tenant Agencies.

The five factors carry equal weight and receive scores on a scale of 1 to 4. A Level IV security level results from a score of 18-20 points. A sixth factor, intangibles, is then applied and can raise or lower the security level by one level. After applying these criteria, the FBI rated the security level needed for the FBI headquarters at a Level V (very high risk). According to the ISC standard, “the criteria and decision-making authority for identifying Level V facilities are within the purview of the individual agency.”

As of the date of this report, the FBI is drafting the program of requirements for the JEH rebuild. Therefore, we cannot verify the security level that the FBI calls for in the program of requirements, nor how the FBI and GSA intend to achieve it. However, FBI and GSA officials have confirmed their intention that the FBI headquarters will be a Level V facility.

---

\(^{14}\) The representative of the tenant agency approved by the department or agency to make such determinations (e.g., the Director of Security might make all determinations to ensure consistency).

\(^{15}\) GAO-12-96, November 2011
The program of requirements for the cancelled JEH exchange project, dated January 15, 2016, also called for a Level V facility. It stated, “Because of the symbolic nature of the client, the client mission, and performance of functions critical to the security of the United States a Facility Security Level V designation was selected for this campus.” The FBI has confirmed that this Level V security level is not site dependent, but based upon the operations of the FBI headquarters.

Once the security level is determined, the facility’s security organization should conduct a risk assessment to identify risk(s). The risk assessment should compare the baseline level of protection with the risks to the facility. If the risks are in line with the baseline level of protection, no customization is needed. If the risks exceed the baseline level of protection, the FBI must decide if a higher level of protection can be achieved, if a different location should be selected, or if risks will be accepted. Until the FBI completes a program of requirements and risk assessment for the project, it will not be able to confirm that the new facility can meet its security needs.

**The ISC standard does not include a minimum setback distance requirement.** For the FBI’s Level V facility, a very high level of protection is required. This very high level of protection is associated with a set of baseline countermeasures. The current ISC standards outline 93 security countermeasures in seven categories:

- Site;
- Structure;
- Facility Entrance;
- Interior;
- Security Systems;
- Security Operations and Administration; and
- Cyber.

The current ISC standard does not explicitly state minimum setback criteria to achieve Level V security, but rather uses a more integrated design approach that recommends a combination of setback and hardening. This lack of minimum setback is a change from the prior ISC standard, and was prompted by the difficulty of obtaining setbacks in urban settings. The current ISC standard states:

> For future building construction (whether lease-construct or government-owned), this Standard shall be applied as part of the requirements definition process. The security organization will conduct a project-specific risk assessment during the requirements definition phase and recommend countermeasures and design features to be included in the design specifications. The FSC will determine whether the identified countermeasures will be implemented or risk will be accepted. Those countermeasures will become part of the facility’s design program requirements to

---

16 FSC refers to Facility Security Committee. In the case of the FBI headquarters, the FSC includes representatives from the FBI and GSA. GSA is not a voting member of the FSC.
ensure required security measures are fully integrated into the configuration of the site and/or building design.

Site security requirements for new construction, particularly setback, must be identified before a site is acquired and the construction funding request is finalized. This may prevent the selection of a site that lacks necessary features, especially sufficient setback, and help reduce the need for more costly countermeasures such as blast hardening.

Under the previous program of requirements for the full consolidation, the FBI was relying on facility setback as one of its main countermeasures. However, with the lesser setback at the JEH site, the FBI will have to integrate alternative countermeasures to achieve the desired level of security.

In response to our questions about the FBI’s plans for security countermeasures for the JEH rebuild, an FBI official provided the following response:

The urban location and site configuration will require [sic] new approach to meet FBI’s operational and security requirements. This will include a varied approach including but not limited to increased hardening, greater application of perimeter protections, and progressive collapse requirements. It will also include re-positioning sensitive operations deeper into the core of the facility, operational and administrative changes and security mitigations as we adjust planning from a suburban campus to a limited metropolitan property location. The blast protection at the JEH will be revised to adjust to the level appropriate for being located in a metropolitan location.

**Administrator Murphy’s April 17, 2018, Testimony**

Murphy told us that in advance of the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government hearing, she participated in a minimum of four preparatory sessions. Murphy said she thought she would be asked at the hearing if the White House was involved in the FBI headquarters project. She stated that the participants in the preparatory sessions agreed that she should try to answer the substance of the question without specifically addressing the White House meetings. If pressed, she would answer that “it would be inappropriate to comment on any discussions I had or did not have with the President.”

On April 17, 2018, Murphy testified at the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government hearing. During the hearing, Murphy was asked about the FBI headquarters project by the Subcommittee’s Ranking Member, Representative Mike Quigley:

Representative Quigley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for being here and again for your service. To your knowledge when did the administration make the decision not to build the suburban FBI facility and instead rebuild where it is?
Murphy: That's – thank you, sir. It's my understanding when – and again I was confirmed in December of last year so I want to be clear that I was not involved with many parts of the decision but I want – I'm going to try and answer your question as fully and as completely as I may – as possible, that last July the – that GSA and the FBI working with OMB reevaluated the lease exchange that had previously been proposed for building a new FBI headquarters and prioritizing the need that there was a new FBI headquarters that was absolutely required. EPW asked – the Environmental and Public Works Committee – forgive me, asked GSA and the FBI to go back and provide them with a report, a plan on the alternatives given that it had also been 14 years since the original program requirements had been developed.

Murphy was then asked about White House involvement in the FBI headquarters project.

Representative Quigley: Was anyone else – at the White House involved with briefing you or to your knowledge did the [P]resident or any of the other officials at the White House consult with any of these other agencies in the decision-making process?

Murphy: Well, sir, the FBI was the one who came to me and said that there’s – their requirements had changed, they no longer required a campus for 11,000 individuals, they were looking at a campus – they only had a requirement for about 8,300 individuals and based on that they wanted to put the J. Edgar Hoover site back into play. They actually requested that GSA consider renovating the building. In my conversations with GSA and then with the FBI we pushed back and didn’t believe that was the right answer. We thought that the renovation of the building wasn’t going to address setback issues and further given that it uses something called post-tensioned cabling to support it would– that any hardening we tried to do with the building wouldn’t be successful and that would be a long-term project that was – it – put the FBI’s initiative at risk. So, GSA then suggested that instead if the requirement was to stay in proximity to the Department of Justice and that location worked and it had the infrastructure in place that GSA proposed instead taking the opportunity to demolish the current FBI headquarters and rebuild on that site something that had (ph) the setbacks, that could do the – couldn’t have hardening, that could meet the requirements of the FBI for that new reduced headcount.

We asked Murphy why she did not disclose the White House involvement in response to this question. Murphy answered that she did not think that was what Representative Quigley was asking. Murphy told us that she interpreted the question as asking how the location decision was made and who she worked with in making the decision. Murphy told us that her answer focused on the substance of the decision regarding the location of the FBI headquarters. Murphy told us that she believed her answer was truthful.

Immediately following her answer quoted above, Representative Quigley asked:
Representative Quigley: But again, to your knowledge was the [P]resident or anyone at the White House involved in those discussions either with your predecessors or people you’re working with now or yourself?

Murphy: Sir, to my knowledge – the direction that we got came from the FBI. They – it was the FBI that directed GSA as to what its requirements would be. We obviously did, given that it is a substantial budget request, we coordinated that request with OMB to make sure that – to provide for funding but the requirements were generated by the FBI.

When asked why she did not disclose White House involvement in response to this second question, Murphy told us that she was trying to answer where the “instruction” came from. She indicated that the instruction came from the FBI. Murphy also told us that Representative Quigley’s opening question asked about the decision to build the FBI headquarters at the existing site, and that she thought that the follow-on question’s reference to “those discussions” referred back to his opening question. As noted above, the opening question posed by Representative Quigley was “[t]o your knowledge, when did the administration make the decision not to build the suburban FBI facility and instead rebuild where it is?” Murphy said that she interpreted both of Representative Quigley’s subsequent questions to relate to this question.

When asked why she did not give the answer that was agreed upon in the preparatory sessions, “it would be inappropriate to comment on any discussions she had or did not have with the President,” Murphy told us that she thought that response would “derail” the hearings and not answer the substance of the question.

We found that Murphy’s answers to the questions about White House involvement were incomplete and may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the President or senior White House officials in the decision-making process about the project. Representative Quigley explicitly asked her whether any White House official briefed her or consulted with the other agencies in the decision-making process. She responded by describing discussions between the FBI and GSA about the FBI’s desire to reconsider the JEH site and whether to renovate the existing building or raze and rebuild. The congressman then asked again whether the President or anyone from the White House was involved in “those discussions.”

Despite her expectation going into the hearing that she would be asked about White House involvement in the project, and despite this second explicit inquiry about discussions with White House officials, Murphy again chose not to disclose the three meetings she had had with White House officials in advance of GSA’s submission of the revised plan for the project. Nor did she state (as she told us she had been prepared to do) that it would be inappropriate for her to comment on any discussions she had or did not have with the President. Instead, she described discussions between GSA and the FBI and briefly mentioned coordinating funding for the project “with OMB.” As a result, her testimony may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the President or senior White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.
Murphy told us that she understood the questions were about how the decision to locate the headquarters at the JEH site was made. Even assuming that was her interpretation of the questions, by Murphy’s own account to us, the White House meeting on December 20, 2017, was an integral part of GSA’s decision-making process on that issue. Murphy told us that at that meeting she and Mathews began presenting campus options for the project, but were told by Kelly and Mulvaney that the FBI was concerned about the location of the headquarters and may no longer be seeking a consolidated campus. She said they also told her that she should touch base with the FBI to get everyone on the same page, and that the goal was to make the FBI happy and the FBI should drive the requirement. After receiving that direction, Murphy talked with Wray and learned of his preference to stay at the JEH site with reduced personnel requirements. GSA and FBI personnel then began discussing options for staying at the JEH site. Similarly, Murphy’s account of the January 24, 2018, White House meetings reflect that those meetings were also part of how the decision to rebuild, rather than renovate, the FBI headquarters at the JEH site was made.

Murphy told us that she believed her answers to Representative Quigley were truthful. We agree that her responses were literally true. However, we found that because she omitted any mention in her answers of her discussions with Kelly, Mulvaney, and the President during the decision-making process for the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, her testimony was incomplete and may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the President or senior White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.

After reviewing a draft of this report, Murphy requested that we remove all discussion of her testimony from our report. Murphy asserted that our conclusion is unfounded and unfair because the congressman’s questions were “clearly limited” to the decision to maintain the location of the FBI headquarters at its present site. We disagree and believe the congressman’s questions speak for themselves, as do Murphy’s answers at the hearing. Murphy’s answers went well beyond the decision not to build a suburban FBI facility.

In response to the congressman’s first question about whether the President or any other White House official consulted with the agencies during the decision-making process, Murphy described at length the discussions GSA and the FBI had about the decision whether to renovate the JEH building or raze and rebuild on the site. Immediately after her description of those discussions about renovation versus raze and rebuild, the congressman again asked, “was the President or anyone at the White House involved in those discussions either with your predecessors or people you’re working with now or yourself?” As described above, Murphy herself told us that at the January 24, 2018, meeting with Kelly and Mulvaney, she and Mulvaney assured Wray that the FBI could return to the JEH site after a rebuild, which helped persuade Wray to support the raze and rebuild scenario rather than the renovation option the FBI had been advocating. Under these circumstances, we cannot ignore Murphy’s failure to disclose that she had discussed those very issues with the President and others at the White House.

In the alternative, Murphy requested that we delete our finding about her testimony and replace it with language she requested for inclusion in the report. For the reasons described in this section, we cannot do so.
Conclusion

Our review found that GSA did not include all of the costs in its Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, and that the JEH demolish and rebuild plan would cost more than the cancelled JEH exchange. We also found that the FBI determined that the security level for the new FBI headquarters is Level V. However, the security level and the countermeasures cannot be definitively determined until the program of requirements is complete and additional risk assessments are completed. As the project progresses, the FBI will further define the specific security needs and the requisite countermeasures for the new FBI headquarters. Lastly, we found that Administrator Murphy’s testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee on April 17, 2018, was incomplete and may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the President or senior White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.